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Comprehension of scalar implicatures in five-year-old Dutch children: 
some but not all five-year old children draw implicatures 
 
Myrthe Faber, Jessica Overweg and Angeliek van Hout 
 





1.1 Scalar implicatures 
 
This study focuses on the conversational implicature known as the scalar 
implicature1. Scalar implicatures may arise whenever expressions like some and most 
are used. These expressions form entailment scales, of which the members are 
ordered depending on the informational strength of utterances containing them, 
such as <all, most, some> (Horn, 1976). Propositions with all are more informative 
than most, which in turn are more informative than some (with informativity 
measured in terms of licensing entailments). In the case of some, most and all, all 
logically entails some and most, given their quantitative properties. When all items 
are in a box, some items are also in the box, and it is also true that most items are in 
the box. When the scalar expression some is used, the two different readings in (1) 
are possible: 
 
(1) Readings of some 
a.  Pragmatic reading: ‘some but not all’ 
b.  Logical reading: ‘some if not all’ (Horn, 1972) 
 
‘Some but not all’ is the pragmatically enriched reading. This reading excludes all 
while the semantic meaning, the non-enriched reading, is compatible with all. For 
instance, consider example (2). 
 
(2) Some elephants have trunks. 
 
Under a logical reading the statement in (2) is felicitous but under a pragmatic 
reading it is infelicitous. When the statement in (2) is taken literally, it is true 
because in the present world elephants generally have trunks. It logically follows that 
at least some elephants have trunks. But this statement can also be considered 
(pragmatically) infelicitous because it is underinformative. It would be more 
informative to use the quantifier all instead of some. According to the traditional 
Gricean account of such examples, if the speaker uses the underinformative or weak 
form on a scale, the listener may assume that the speaker is not in a position to use 
the informative or strong form on the scale (Grice, 1975). By using some instead of all 
                                                 
1 This research is part of the EU-funded COST A33 project “Crosslinguistically Robust Stages of 
Children’s Linguistic Performance, with Applications to the Diagnosis of Specific Language 
Impairment” (P.I. U. Sauerland, 2006-2010). Researchers from twenty-five different countries 
participate. The goal is to provide a cross-linguistically uniform picture of 5-year-olds’ knowledge of 
grammar, which can serve as the basis for further research into clinical markers for the detection of 
SLI. The COST research themes include pronouns, quantification, implicatures, passives, tense and 
aspect, and questions. 
 http://www.zas.gwz-berlin.de/index.php?id=47&L=1 
Groninger Arbeiten zur germanistischen Linguistik 51 (2010), 55-74 
Center for Language and Cognition Groningen 
http://gagl.eldoc.ub.rug.nl
a listener interprets the meaning in (2) with a pragmatic reading, namely as “not all 
elephants have trunks”. This inference is called a scalar implicature.  
With regard to the computation of a scalar implicature, the quantifier most 
behaves like some. For instance, consider example (3). 
 
(3) Most elephants have trunks.  
 
Example (3) is true in case the number of elephants who have trunks is larger than 
the number of elephants who do not (i.e., if more than half of the elephants have 
trunks). This literal meaning can be upper bounded by a scalar implicature (“more 
than half but not all”) (Horn, 1972).  
 
1.2 Acquisition research on scalar implicatures 
 
Noveck (2001) discovered that children systematically lack scalar implicatures. He 
used a statement evaluation task to test the computation of scalar implicatures in 8- 
and 10-year-old French-speaking children and found that children have difficulty 
accessing the pragmatically strengthened meaning of the weak scalar item some. 
Instead, they interpret an underinformative statement such as (2) with a logical 
reading, i.e., according to its literal meaning. Most adults consider this statement 
infelicitous because it is underinformative. They interpret the statement according to 
its pragmatic reading. Both observations also seem to hold cross-linguistically in a 
uniform fashion: in addition to Noveck's research on French, several other languages 
such as Greek, Italian and English have been investigated (respectively Papafragou & 
Musolino, 2003; Guasti, 2005; Katsos & Bishop, 2011; among others).  
Papafragou and Musolino (2003) showed that children’s performance with 
implicatures improves under certain conditions. In their experiment they tested two 
groups of five-year-old children; one group without a training phase and one group 
with a training phase. In this training phase children were trained to detect 
infelicitous statements. During the test phase a Truth Value Judgment Task was 
used, where all children were introduced to a puppet. The puppet said things that 
were true, but infelicitous. The children were asked to judge descriptions of acted-out 
stories given by the puppet. As a result of the training phase, the computation of 
scalar implicatures triggered by some improved from 12.5% (group without training 
phase) to 52.5% (group with training phase) for the five-year-old-children, even 
though this was still lower than in the adult group (92.5%). According to Papafragou 
and Musolino the introduction of training and clear informativeness expectations in 
the critical trials made children more likely to judge underinformative statements as 
bad descriptions of what happened. However, even in these contexts, children only 
showed sensitivity to scalar implicatures about half of the time.  
Guasti et al. (2005) tested seven-year-old Italian speaking children using a 
statement evaluation task (replication of Noveck, 2001). In their experiment, one of 
two groups of children participated in a training session before the test phase. Their 
results were rather similar to the results of Papafragou and Musolino: the rejection 
rate of pragmatically underinformative statements was 12% for children without 
training, and rose to 52% with training. However, the children’s responses in the 
group with training session formed a bimodal distribution, suggesting that the 
training had a strong effect on some children, but not on all children. Also, they 
showed that the effect of training is only temporary. When children were tested one 
week later (without training phase), the rejection rate of pragmatically 
underinformative statements dropped from 52% to 22%.  
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In addition to children, Guasti et al. (2005) tested adults using the same 
statement evaluation task. Although the level of performance by adults was superior 
to that of children, their performance on underinformative statements was not at 
ceiling. Adults rejected underinformative sentences only 50% of the time. To test 
whether the results of the children and adults were due to experimental design, 
Guasti et al. used a truth value judgment task. Their results with this task were 
strikingly different; 75% of the children and 83% of the adults rejected 
underinformative statements.   
Pouscoulous et al. (2007) also showed that the type of task influences 
comprehension of scalar implicatures. They showed that the task is easier for 
children when using action-based judgments instead of meta-linguistic judgments. 
An action-based task would spare younger children’s cognitive resources that they 
may in turn use to compute the scalar implicature. The results show that four-year-
old and five-year-old children are able to compute an implicature in an action-based 
task (respectively 68% and 73%). Seven-year-old children (83%) show almost adult-
like behavior (86%) on this task.   
With regard to cross-linguistic comparability, the choice of the particular scalar 
expression used in the task has been shown to influence the results. For example, 
many languages have several ways to translate the English quantifier some. 
Pouscoulous et al. (2007) showed that French translations quelques and certains 
affect implicature drawing in children but not in adults. Certains is linguistically 
more complex because it is a partitive, while quelques is simpler. Nine-year-old 
French-speaking children are more likely to produce implicatures in an action-based 
task with the less complex quantifier quelques (100% of the time) compared to the 
more complex quantifier certains (58% of the time). This difference in implicature 
computation is attributed to the complexity of certains. Children have fewer 
resources left to compute the implicature.  
Banga et al. (2009) showed that choice of scalar expression also influences the 
results of Dutch adults. They investigated the computation of scalar implicatures by 
Dutch adults using Dutch translations sommige (‘some’) and enkele (‘some’). Purely 
quantitative terms such as Dutch enkele (85.5%) gave rise to more implicatures than 
partly qualitative terms such as sommige (75%), suggesting that subtle semantic 
differences between scalar terms affect the rate of implicatures in adults. 
Surprisingly, when investigating sommige (‘some’) but not enkele (‘some’), their 
results show that adults drew implicatures with sommige only 41.2% of the time.   
The study of Koch et al. (2010) provides further evidence that the overall pattern 
of acquisition of scalar implicatures also holds for German-speaking children. 
Children derived significantly fewer implicatures than adults (20% vs. 56%). In 
underinformative conditions, German-speaking five-year-old children showed a clear 
preference for logical interpretations of scalar quantifiers such as some (not) and 
most (not). However, their performance on the semantic control conditions showed 
that children at age five do understand the core meaning of the quantifiers some 
(not) and most (not), where they behave like the adults (respectively, 95.7% and 
99.8% correct responses on the semantic control conditions).  
In this study we focused on the acquisition of scalar implicatures of five-year-old 
children in a West-Germanic language, namely Dutch. Not much is known about the 
acquisition of scalar implicatures in Dutch children. In the next session we report on 




                              GAGL 51 (2010) 
Faber et al, Comprehension of scalar implicatures
57
2 Research questions 
 
This experiment is designed to assess the understanding of quantifier semantics and 
the generation of scalar implicatures. It measures the child’s ability to evaluate 
utterances based on their pragmatically enriched meaning, rejecting those that are 
underinformative with regard to the presented scene. Also, the experiment assesses 
the child’s abilities to interpret and reject utterances in which the quantifier interacts 
with the scope of a negation (for example “not all” and “all ... not”)2. The first 
research question is therefore: 
 
(4) How do five-year-old Dutch-speaking children score on a test designed to 
investigate whether they can draw implicatures? 
 
Furthermore, we will look into these results in more detail analyzing the individual 
answer patterns. Different patterns may underlie the same group results. For 
example, Pouscoulous et al. (2007) have shown that four-year-old children have a 
group score of 68% correct for drawing implicatures in an action based task (note 
that Pouscoulous et al. do not report on the distribution of their results). Such a 
group score could be normally distributed, which means that, besides the outliers, 
each child scores within a normal range that has 68% as its mean. On the other hand, 
the scores of the group may not be normally distributed but in a different way, such 
as bimodally. For example, if most children always draw implicatures, while the 
others never do, this would also lead to a group percentage of 68%. This distribution 
is similar to what Guasti et al. (2005) found for Italian–speaking seven-year-olds. 
















Figure 1: Illustration of unimodal (left) and bimodal distribution (right) with mean 
= 68 and standard deviation = 5.1 
 
The second research question is therefore: 
 
(5) What is the distribution of individual scores underlying the group data?  
 
                                                 
2 http://cost.zas.gwz-berlin.de/cost/A33-e.pdf 
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If the subject analyses reveal that the distribution of the data is bimodal, suggesting 
that some children draw implicatures in most cases, while others do not, a third 
research question becomes pertinent:  
 
(6) Why do some five-year-old children seem to draw implicatures, while other five-
year-olds seem not to? 
 
To answer this question, we will investigate whether (any one of) three factors affect 
implicature drawing. These factors are: general linguistics abilities (as measured by 
their scores on the GAPS test), age and the interpretation of the quantifiers used in 
control conditions. We test three predictions: 
 
(7) a. Children with a higher score on the GAPS test draw more implicatures. 
b. Children who are older draw more implicatures. 
c. Children who have a higher score on the control items for quantifier semantics 
draw more implicatures. 
 
The relevance of this study is two-fold. First, by presenting the first study on scalar 
implicatures in Dutch five-year-old children, we contribute to the development of an 
(potentially cross-linguistic) assessment tool for diagnosing linguistic delays. Second, 
we contribute to the fast growing body of literature on scalar implicatures and 
semantic-pragmatic development by carefully analyzing the distribution of individual 




3.1 Participants  
 
Twenty-four five-year-old children (mean age: 5;3; range: 5;0 to 5;7) and ten adult 
controls (mean age: 27) participated in this study. The children were recruited from 
three different kindergartens in Groningen, Haren and Emmen (Netherlands). All 
participants were native Dutch speakers. 
 
3.2 Experimental design  
 
To assess the understanding of quantifiers and the child’s ability to draw 
implicatures, a sentence evaluation task was used. This task was modelled along the 
lines of the Quantifier Comprehension task, used by Katsos et al. (2011). Sentences 
containing quantifiers were judged for a visual arrangement of five boxes that did or 
did not have (some) objects inside them. In Dutch, the following seven quantifying 
expressions were tested: sommige (‘some’), de meeste (‘the most’), niet alle (‘not all’), 
sommige…niet (‘some…not’), alle (‘all’), geen van de (‘none’) and alle…niet 
(‘all…not’). These quantifiers were combined with one of 25 object nouns to form 
statements like example (8). 
 
(8) Sommige appels liggen in de dozen.  
some   apples  lie    in  the boxes 
‘Some [of the] apples are in the boxes.’ 
 
These statements were uttered in the context of one of the following four visual 
arrangements: ‘all-arrangement’ (where all five out of five objects are in the boxes), 
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‘subset-arrangement’ (where two of the objects are in the boxes), ‘most-arrangement’ 
(where four out of five objects are in the boxes), and ‘none-arrangement’ (where 
none of the objects are in the boxes). Depending on the quantifier and the 
arrangement of objects in the boxes in the visual display, the sentences are either 
true, false or underinformative. The dependent variable was the child’s judgement. 
In our analysis, we focused on the quantifiers sommige (‘some’) and de meeste 
(‘most’), because they trigger implicatures. These quantifiers were presented in three 
conditions: true, false and underinformative. The underinformative condition was 
the critical condition in which implicatures can be drawn; the other two were used as 
control conditions to investigate whether children fully understand the quantifiers on 
target. For each quantifier there were six items in the critical condition. Of the items 
in the control conditions, three were true and three were false. Figures 2, 3 and 4 








Sommige sinaasappels liggen in de dozen.  









Sommige gitaren liggen in de dozen.  








Sommige appels liggen in de dozen.  




Figure 4: Example critical condition Underinformative: sommige (‘some’) in all-
arrangement 
 
For the quantifier de meeste (‘most’), the true condition was presented with a most-
arrangement, false condition with a sub-set arrangement and the underinformative  
(critical) condition with an all-arrangement.   
We also used the understanding of alle (‘all’) and geen (‘none’) as additional 
control conditions. Both of these conditions consist of six items, of which three are 
true and three are false. For both the quantifiers alle (‘all’) and geen (‘none’), the 
false condition is presented with a sub-set arrangement. The true conditions were an 
all-arrangement for alle (‘all’) and a none-arrangement for geen (‘none’). The order 
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of the items in the experiment was pseudo-randomized and the items were presented 
in six blocks. Also, the experiment was presented in three different lists to avoid any 
confounding factors due to the order of the items. For an overview of the used items, 
we refer to the appendix of this paper.  
The most important independent variable is age. To keep this variable constant 
on the group level, the children that were tested in this study are between 5;0 and 5;7 
years old. For the subject analyses, age was measured in months. Finally, we used the 
Dutch version of the Grammar and Phonology Screening (GAPS)3 test to assess the 
child’s general linguistic abilities. The GAPS test is a short screening test that can be 
used to asses the grammatical abilities and pre-reading skills of children between 3;6 
and 6;6 years old. The two key abilities that are tested using GAPS are whether a 
child knows how to use grammatical rules to create sentences (sentence repetition) 





The experiment was presented to the child on a laptop, using Microsoft PowerPoint. 
The experimenter first introduced a fictional character, the Cave girl, and explained 
the task: “We are going to play a game on the computer with a friend of mine. Shall I 
introduce you to my friend? Her name is Cave girl!” Cave girl says in a pre-recorded 
voice in Dutch: “Hello! I am the Cave girl. I know quite a lot of Dutch and I would 
like to learn more and speak Dutch like you do! Will you help me?”. Then, the 
experimenter says to the participant: “We are going to help the Cave girl to say how 
many things are in the boxes. Here are the boxes [POINTS TO THE BOXES ON THE 
TOP OF THE SCREEN], and here are the items.” The experimenter asked the child to 
name all of the items, to make sure that the child understand all the nouns used in 
the experiment.  When all the items are named, the experimenter continues: “We are 
going to see some pictures, and the Cave girl will say how many things are in the 
boxes. If she says it right, you tell her “that was right!”. If she says it wrong, you tell 
her “that was wrong!”. And to help her learn, you could tell her why it was wrong. So, 
are you ready?”. Once the participant says that s/he is ready, Cave girl also asserts 
“OK! I am ready too.” In the warming-up part of the experiment, the experimenter 
tells the child “Now, the Cave girl has to learn to use words like ‘one’, ‘two’, ‘three’, 
‘four’, and ‘five’”. Before the main part of the experiment starts, the experimenter 
tells the participant “Now, the Cave girl has to learn to use words like ‘all’, ‘none’ and 
‘some’”. The warming-up phase at the beginning of the experiment is designed to 
make sure the child is able to (a) count up to five, and (b) accept and reject 
utterances with number words. 
 
3.4 Scoring and coding 
 
The responses given during the experiment were recorded using a voice recorder. 
The answers were scored on a score form by (one of) the experimenter(s). When a 
participant rejected an utterance, the experimenter asked why. These justifications 
for rejection were used to evaluate whether the participant actually drew the relevant 
implicature in the critical conditions, or whether the participant had other (trivial) 
reasons unrelated to falsity or informativeness for rejecting the utterance. When the 
justifications for rejecting an utterance were trivial, the answer was coded as “not 
                                                 
3 See Gardner et al. (2006) for a more detailed description of the GAPS test.  
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drawing the implicature”. In this case the final answer was changed from ‘no’ to ‘yes’. 
However, if children seemed unsure of the final answer, but gave the right reasoning, 
showing that they actually drew the implicature, this was coded as “being aware of 
underinformativeness / drawing the implicature”. In this case the final answer was 
changed from ‘yes’ to ‘no’. Note however, that this could not be done systematically, 
because the children were only asked for a justification when they rejected the 
utterance. A few examples are given in Figure 5: 
 
Not drawing the implicature (irrelevant reason): 
 
Sommige auto’s liggen in de dozen. 
‘Some (of the) cars are in the boxes. 
 
Subject 7; age 5;03 : 
“Nee, die gaan in een garage” 
‘No, they go in a garage’ 
 
Subject 10; age 5;01 :  
“Nee, te groot” 
‘No, too big’ 
 
Aware of underinformativeness / drawing implicature: 
 
Sommige poppen liggen in de dozen.  
‘Some (of the) dolls are in the boxes.’ 
 
Subject 20; age 5;3 :  
“Allen! Niet goed. Eh, ik bedoel wel goed.” 





De meeste appels liggen in de dozen.  
‘Most of the apples are in the boxes.’ 
 
Subject 20; age 5;3 :  
“Niet, allen, niet goed. Eh, ik bedoel wel goed.” 
‘No, all of them, not right. Eh, right I mean.’ 
 





4.1 Results underinformative items 
 
Twenty-four children participated in this study. Four children were excluded from 
analysis. Two of them were excluded because they did not understand the 
experiment properly. They showed a ‘yes’-bias when all items were in boxes and a 
‘no’-bias otherwise, regardless of the quantifier used. Two other children were 
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excluded based on their scores on the control items for alle (‘all’) and geen (‘no’) (less 
than ten out of twelve items correct). In total, the scores of twenty children were used 
in the main analysis.  
The test items involve sommige (‘some’) and de meeste (‘most’) in the all-
arrangement). The mean group score on these underinformative items for sommige 
(‘some’) is 3.8 (out of a maximum score of six), or 63% rejection. The mean group 
score on the underinformative test items for de meeste (‘most’) is 2.75 (out of a 
maximum score of six), or 46% rejection. Children thus seem to draw implicatures 
more often in the sommige (‘some’) condition compared to the de meeste (‘most’) 
condition. The mean group score of the adults on these underinformative items for 
sommige (‘some’) is 4.3 (out of a maximum score of six), or 68% rejection. The mean 
group score on the underinformative test items for de meeste (‘most’) is 3.6 (out of a 
maximum score of six), or 60% rejection. Like the children, the adults also seem to 
draw implicatures more often in the sommige (‘some’) condition than in the de 
meeste (‘most’) condition.  
 
4.2 Distribution of results 
 
The individual scores of the children were used to look into the distribution the 
implicatures (‘no’-answers). The histogram in Figures 6 and 7 represent the number 
of children who gave the target ‘no’-answer 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6 times. The maximum 

















Figure 6: Distribution of number of    Figure 7: Distribution of number of 
implicatures for sommige (‘some’)     implicatures for de meeste (‘most’) 
in all-arrangement         in all-arrangement 
 
Figure 6 and 7 illustrate that most children were consistent with their answers and 
answered either “yes” or “no” to all or almost all of the test items. Only a few children 
were not consistent. The children on the left-hand side of the histograms are those 
who hardly ever or never draw an implicature and hence answer “yes”; the children 
on the right-hand side draw implicatures in most or all of the cases and hence answer 
“no”. This bimodal distribution is found for both sommige (‘some’) and de meeste 
(‘most’). 
 Furthermore, we calculated the total number of implicatures drawn by each 
participant (children and adults) in the critical sommige (‘some’) and de meeste 
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(‘most’) conditions together. These total numbers were then binned in three 
categories: zero to three implicatures, four to eight implicatures and nine to twelve 
implicatures.  Figure 8 shows the percentage of children and the percentage of adults 















Figure 8: Distribution (in %) of implicatures drawn for sommige (‘some’) and de 
meeste (‘most’) in the all-arrangement 
 
Figure 8 illustrates that the distribution of answers given by the adults is different 
from the distribution of answers given by the children. The children are on either end 
of the continuum: they only draw three or fewer implicatures, or they draw nine or 
more implicatures (only one child drew five out of twelve implicatures, consisting of 
three pragmatic answers in the sommige (‘some’) condition and two pragmatic 
answers in the de meeste (‘most’) condition). Adults on the other hand do not show a 
similarly clear bimodal distribution; rather, the data shows a skewed distribution.  
Another observation is that there is a correlation between the scores in the  
critical conditions for sommige (‘some’) and de meeste (‘most’) for the children (R2= 
0.8276, p < 0.0001). This means that the children who have high scores on the 
sommige (‘some’) condition also have high scores on the de meeste (‘most’) 
condition. This is illustrated in Figure 9.  
 
Figure 9: Scatterplot of the number of implicatures drawn by the children in the 
sommige (‘some’) and de meeste (‘most’) condition. The trendline is shown in 
dashes. 
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Given that the distribution of the data is bimodal, suggesting that some children 
draw implicatures in most cases, while others do not, the third research question 
becomes pertinent: Why do some five-year-old children seem to draw implicatures, 
while other five-year-olds seem not to? To answer this question, we further analyzed 
the data, looking into correlations between the implicature score and three other 
measures: general linguistic abilities, age and whether the child fully understands the 
quantifier. 
 
4.3.1 Linguistic abilities 
 
To test the hypothesis that children with a higher score on the GAPS test draw more 
implicatures, we calculated the correlation coefficient to analyze the relationship 
between general linguistic abilities (for which we used the GAPS-test as our measure) 
and whether a child draws an implicature or not. To see how well children performed 
on the implicature condition, we used the total implicature score; i.e. the 12 items of 
the sommige (‘some’) and de meeste (‘most’) test conditions together. In Figure 10, 
the score on the GAPS test is plotted on the y-axis (note that only eleven out of the 
twenty children were assessed using the GAPS). The maximal obtainable score on the 
GAPS test is 20 points. The total implicature score is on the x-axis; the higher the 
number, the more implicatures the child drew. Figure 10 illustrates that there is no 
relationship between GAPS and drawing an implicature; the correlation coefficient is 
near zero (R2 = 0.08, p = 0.39).  
 
 
Figure 10: Scatterplot of the GAPS score and the total number of implicatures 
drawn in the sommige (‘some’) and de meeste (‘most’) condition. The trendline is 




Similarly, we calculated the correlation coefficient to analyze the relationship 
between age and whether a child draws an implicature. In Figure 11, the age (years, 
months) is on the y-axis. The total implicature score is on the x-axis. Figure 11 
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illustrates that there is no relationship between age and whether a child draws an 
implicature (R2= 0.09, p = 0.18).  
 
Figure 11: Scatterplot of the age of the child and the total number of implicatures 
drawn in the sommige (‘some’) and de meeste (‘most’) condition. The trendline is 
shown in dashes. 
 
4.3.3 Quantifier understanding 
 
Furthermore, we calculated the correlation coefficient to analyze the relationship 
between the understanding of each quantifier and whether a child draws an 
implicature or not. In figure 11, the score on the six control items for sommige 
(‘some’) is on the y-axis. In figure 12, the score on the six control items for de meeste 
(‘most’) is on the y-axis. Both figures show the number of implicatures on the x-axis; 
figure 12 for the sommige (‘some’) condition and figure 13 for the de meeste (‘most’) 
condition. Note that in both conditions, children were not at ceiling with regard to 
the control items.  
 
Figure 12: Scatterplot of the number of control items correct for sommige (‘some’) 
and the number of implicatures drawn for sommige (‘some’) in an all-arrangement. 
The trendline is shown in dashes. 
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Figure 13: Scatterplot of the number of control items correct for de meeste (‘most’) 
and the number of implicatures drawn for de meeste (‘most’) in an all-arrangement. 
The trendline is shown in dashes. 
 
As Figure 12 illustrates, there is no correlation between the score on the control items 
for sommige (‘some’) and drawing an implicature with sommige (‘some’), R2 < 0.01, 
p = 0.52. Similarly, figure 13 illustrates that there is no correlation between the score 
on the control items for de meeste (‘most’) and drawing an implicature with de 
meeste (‘most’), R2 < 0.01, p = 0.81.  
 
4.4 Results error analysis 
 
We also analyzed the errors children made in the control conditions for sommige 
(‘some’) and de meeste (‘most’). In our experiment, the control conditions for 
sommige (‘some’) were the none-arrangement (false) and subset-arrangement (true). 
We hypothesize that children make errors in the control condition where sommige 
(‘some’) is presented in a subset-arrangement, suggesting that they have a different 
understanding of what sommige (‘some’) means, but do understand that it is 
different from none (note that this hypothesis also challenges a ‘yes’-bias, because we 
predict that most of the errors will be in the true condition). We found that 92% of 
the errors are indeed in the condition where sommige (‘some’) is presented in a 
subset-arrangement (total number of errors = 13). A one-sided binomial test 
indicates that this finding is highly significant (p = .0017).  
Furthermore, we analyzed the errors children made in the control items for de 
meeste (‘most’). These control items consisted of de meeste (‘most’) in most-
arrangement (TRUE) and de meeste (‘most’) in a subset-arrangement (FALSE). 
Here, we hypothesize that children will make most errors in the condition where de 
meeste (‘most’) is presented in a subset-arrangement, suggesting that they do not 
fully understand what de meeste (‘most’) means, because they perceive a subset-
arrangement as most. We found that 71% of the errors are in the subset-arrangement 
(total number of errors = 24). A one-sided binomial test shows that this result is 
highly significant (p = .0320). 
These analyses of errors in the critical condition for sommige (‘some’) and de 
meeste (‘most) revealed that high percentage of the errors was made in control items 
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in the arrangement where the quantifier is TRUE. We looked into the justifications 
given for rejection by the children to find out why they reject the utterances. Most 
children reported that the utterance with the quantifier sommige (‘some’) is wrong in 
a subset-arrangement because “there are (only) two objects in the boxes”. They reject 
the quantifier de meeste (‘most’) in a most-arrangement for similar reasons, for 




5.1 Lexical knowledge 
 
Our results show that drawing an implicature is not affected by general linguistics 
abilities, age and the interpretation of quantifier semantics. This raises an interesting 
issue: how can it be that children who do not fully understand a quantifier are still 
able to draw implicatures? We suggest that understanding that some and most differ 
from all (and none) is sufficient lexical information to draw an implicature. One 
might be able to draw an implicature if one knows that some and most are on a scale 
of informativeness, without knowing the core meaning. Our data illustrates this in 
the following way: the control items for all are presented in an all-arrangement 
(TRUE) and a subset-arrangement (FALSE). The control items for none are 
presented in a none-arrangement (TRUE) and a subset-arrangement (FALSE). 
Because we only selected children who score ten or more points out of twelve points 
on these control items, we know that the children in our data know the difference 
between all and some and none and some. However, this does not necessarily entail 
that children know exactly what some or most means. As we have seen in the error 
analysis, the children made most errors where the utterances with the quantifiers 
some and most were TRUE. This finding might be due to the difference in control 
condition where the utterance is TRUE, since de meeste (‘most’) was tested in a 
subset-arrangement while sommige (‘some’) was tested in a none-arrangement. The 
children in our data do know the difference between none and most (based on the 
fact that they do know the difference between none and some).  If de meeste (‘most’) 
will be tested in a none-arrangement, the number of errors for de meeste (‘most’) will 
most probably be lower. Conversely, if sommige (‘some’) would be tested in a most-
arrangement, this would probably generate more errors. 
On the other hand, the justifications children gave for rejecting the utterances 
where the quantifiers are suppose to be TRUE, tell that they associated the 
quantifiers with a specific quantity of objects, suggesting they have problems with 
understanding the core meaning of the quantifiers some and most. According to 
Katsos et al. (2011) these errors are not related to logical complexity of the 
quantifiers but to the vagueness. Mastering the logical meaning of some requires 
understanding that the quantifier is true in a wide range of circumstances (in this 
case ranging from two or more to five) while all is true in only one situation, namely 
five out of five objects are in the boxes. Further research is required to learn more 
about comprehension of the quantifiers sommige (‘some’) and de meeste (‘most’) in 
five-year-old children.   
 
5.2 Acquisition of informativeness 
 
Our results reflect a bimodal distribution: some children never or only very rarely 
draw an implicature, whereas other children draw an implicature most of the time. 
The question is how this pattern can be explained. Our results showed that children 
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who draw implicatures with the quantifier sommige (‘some’) also draw implicatures 
with the quantifier de meeste (‘most’). This finding suggests that once children 
acquire the ability to draw implicatures for one quantifier, it carries over to another 
quantifier (bearing in mind that most is overall harder than some). An important 
question that rises, is how informativeness develops. Guasti et al. (2005) report that 
achieving competence with the Gricean maxim of informativeness involves a 
categorical transition from underinformativeness to informativeness without 
fluctuation between the two stages. This may also explain why our results reflect a 
bimodal distribution: once children achieve competence with the maxim of 
informativeness they draw an implicature most of the time.  
Another question that rises, is how informativeness can be mastered. Katsos et al. 
(2011) suggest that informativeness is mastered across the board, regardless of the 
specific quantifier mentioned. This is in line with the results of our data, given the 
fact that children who draw implicatures with one quantifier also draw implicatures 
with another quantifier. Katsos et al. also suggest that children cannot be expected to 
be informative and derive the scalar implicatures associated with a quantifier if they 
have not yet acquired what the quantifier means and discovered where it would enter 
into a scale of informativeness. However, this is not in line with our study, since the 
children who drew implicatures most of the times did not show a better 
understanding of the quantifier (see 5.1). More research is needed to answer the 
question how informativeness is mastered, and what the role of quantifier 
understanding is in implicature drawing. 
 
5.3 Task effect: sentence evaluation tasks 
 
An important methodological issue is that because of the nature of the task, 
participants are forced to choose between acceptance and rejection. Even though the 
experiment was designed as a sentence evaluation task, the binary choice pushes it 
towards a truth-value judgment task (TVJT). In a sentence evaluation task subjects 
are asked to judge whether or not the sentence is (the most) appropriate (way) to 
describe a situation. However, in a TVJT subjects have to judge whether the 
proposition expressed by the sentence is true or false. An advantage of the truth-
value judgment task is that the task can be used to access children’s full range of 
grammatical competence, by allowing the researcher to test directly for various 
possible interpretations (Chien & Wexler, 1987). However, one of the objections 
against this kind of task is that because the utterance is true in terms of truth-value, 
children may not reject the utterance. A truth-value judgment task allows to see all of 
the possible interpretations that a child allows (van Hout et al., 2010), as opposed to 
other experimental designs that show which interpretation is preferred (Avrutin & 
Baauw, 2005). Examples are sentence-to-picture matching tasks and act-out tasks, 
which both show that children are informative comprehenders (Katsos & Smith, 
2010). Although the choice of task in this study limits the conclusions that can be 
drawn about the actual understanding of informativeness in five-year-olds, we will 
argue below that there are other conclusions that can be drawn.  
 
5.4 Pragmatic Tolerance Hypothesis 
 
Recent studies (Katsos & Bishop, 2011; Katsos & Smith, 2010) have shown that there 
is a production-comprehension asymmetry of underinformative utterances in five-
year-old English speaking children. In production over 90% of these children are 
fully informative speakers, while in comprehension fewer than 30% of the 
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underinformative utterances were rejected. In addition, these children were 100% 
able to reject false utterances, indicating that this pattern cannot be explained by an 
inability to reject utterances in general. So children seem to fail to comprehend 
pragmatic aspects of meaning, even though they do not seem to have any difficulty to 
produce pragmatically appropriate utterances as speakers (Davies & Katsos, 2010). 
This is in line with Reinhart’s (2004) Interface Asymmetry account, which predicts 
no delays to arise in production while comprehension is comprised. In 
comprehension hearers must compare interpretations through an operation called 
reference-set computation but in production this is superfluous because the speaker 
“always knows which meaning he or she intends”. According to Reinhart, 
comprehension is comprised due to working memory limitations concerning 
reference-set computation. Another possible explanation is that children have 
different expectations about the required level of informativeness in a specific 
situation than adults, and that children therefore do not see a need for rejecting 
underinformative utterances (Papafragou & Musolino, 2003). This view is expanded 
by the Pragmatic Tolerance hypothesis (Katsos & Smith, 2010; Davies & Katsos, 
2010; Katsos & Bishop, 2011). The hypothesis predicts that “in certain cases, children 
are in fact pragmatically competent both as speakers and as comprehenders and 
what develops with age is their meta-linguistic awareness about accepting or 
rejecting pragmatically infelicitous utterances as comprehenders” (Davies & Katsos, 
2010; p.1956). We argue that the age of 5;0 to 5;7 might be a critical age for the 
development of this meta-linguistic awareness. The bimodal distribution might 
reflect that some, but not all, children already have this meta-linguistic awareness.  
 Furthermore, the Pragmatic Tolerance Hypothesis is supported by the hypothesis 
that low child performance in comprehension is an artefact of the task with which 
underinformativeness has been studied (Katsos & Bishop, 2011). Katsos and Bishop 
hypothesize that the violation of pragmatics - unlike the violation of semantics - does 
not lead to utterances that are logically false, meaning that underinformative 
utterances are still in a sense “right”. Children therefore may not reject 
underinformative utterance in a binary choice task, because rejection is the response 
appropriate to falsity. They also find that adults differentiate between false and 
underinformative utterances in an indirect way. While adults straightforwardly 
rejected semantically false utterances, many underinformative utterances were 
“objected to by accepting that the utterance was true, but highlighting that something 
important was not mentioned” (Davies & Katsos, 2010: 1960). Similar patterns were 
found in our data. First, we found that adults indirectly differentiate between false 
and underinformative utterances. Adults often came up with answers like “yes, it’s 
true, but actually all of the items are in the boxes”, indicating that something 
important was not mentioned. Second, we found that also children sometimes 
indirectly differentiate between false and underinformative utterances. The children 
were less specific, but we did see them hesitate and occasionally come up with 
answers like “all, not right, eh I mean right”. This result might indicate that these 
children did not reject because rejection is the response to falsity. The pragmatic 
answer (rejection) is argued to reflect the insight in the logical entailment (when it is 
true that all items are in the boxes, it is also true that some items are in the boxes), as 
well as the insight in a scale (when there is a stronger term on the scale to describe 
the situation, use that term). The logical answer (acceptance) on the other hand does 
not necessarily rule out the pragmatic reasoning. Because of the experimental design 
and time limitations, the experimenters only asked for the reason for rejection, not 
for the reason for acceptance. Therefore, we may have overlooked important meta-
linguistic reasoning underlying acceptance. 
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This study focused on the acquisition of scalar implicatures in five-year-old Dutch 
children. We investigated whether acceptance or rejection of an underinformative 
utterance depends on lexical knowledge of quantifiers, age or general language 
development. We have found that none of these three factors affects implicature 
drawing. We suggest that understanding that some and most differ from all (and 
none) is for children sufficient lexical information to draw an implicature. Children 
do not have to understand the core meaning of the quantifiers some and most to 
draw an implicature.  
Furthermore, we found that children between 5;0 and 5;7 years old show different 
patterns of acceptance and rejection, resulting in a bimodal distribution. We argue 
that children may have different expectations about the informativeness of an 
utterance than adults (cf. Papafragou & Musolino, 2003). What develops with age is 
their meta-linguistic awareness about accepting or rejecting pragmatically 
infelicitous utterances (cf. Davies & Katsos, 2010). Our results imply that around the 
age of 5;0-5;7, there may be a critical period for the development of a child’s meta-
linguistic abilities. 
Finally, we found that once children acquire the ability to draw implicatures for 
one quantifier, it carries over to another quantifier, suggesting that children achieve 
competence with the maxim of informativeness and become more informative once 
they draw implicatures with one quantifier. This implies that informativeness is 
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Appendix Item list 
 
The first column presents the utterance. In the second column you can find the 
arrangement of how many objects were inside the boxes and the third column encodes which 
response is correct.  
 
Numerals 
Twee appels liggen in de dozen      ARR: two  RIGHT 
‘Two apples are in the boxes’    
Drie appels liggen in de dozen       ARR: four  WRONG 
‘Three apples are in the boxes’ 
Eén appel ligt in de dozen       ARR: one   RIGHT 
‘One apple is in the boxes’    
Vier appels liggen in de dozen      ARR: three  WRONG 
‘Four apples are in the boxes’    
Vijf appels liggen in de dozen      ARR: five   RIGHT 
‘Five apples are in the boxes ‘  
 
Alle (‘All’) 
Alle ballen liggen in de dozen      ARR: all   RIGHT   
‘All the balls are in the boxes’ 
Alle dino’s liggen in de dozen      ARR: all   RIGHT   
‘All the dinosaurs are in the boxes’ 
Alle pennen liggen in de dozen      ARR: all   RIGHT  
‘All the pens are in the boxes’  
Alle boterhammen liggen in de dozen    ARR: two   WRONG 
‘All the sandwiches are in the boxes’  
Alle schoenen liggen in de dozen     ARR: two   WRONG 
‘All the shoes are in the boxes’ 
Alle T-shirts liggen in de dozen      ARR: two   WRONG 
‘All the t-shirts are in the boxes’ 
 
Meeste (‘Most’) 
De meeste appels liggen in de dozen    ARR: five   WRONG   
‘Most of the apples are in the boxes’  
De meeste gitaren liggen in de dozen    ARR: five   WRONG 
‘Most of the guitars are in the boxes’  
De meeste teddy beren liggen in de dozen   ARR: five   WRONG 
‘Most of the teddy-bears are in the boxes’  
De meeste treinen liggen in de dozen    ARR: five   WRONG  
‘Most of the trains are in the boxes’ 
De meeste sinaasappels liggen in de dozen  ARR: five   WRONG 
‘Most of the oranges are in the boxes’  
De meeste aardbeien liggen in de dozen   ARR: five   WRONG 
‘Most of the strawberries are in the boxes’  
De meeste vazen liggen in de dozen    ARR: four  RIGHT 
‘Most of the vases are in the boxes’ 
De meeste schoenen liggen in de dozen   ARR: four  RIGHT   
‘Most of the shoes are in the boxes’  
De meeste poppen liggen in de dozen    ARR: four  RIGHT  
‘Most of the dolls are in the boxes’ 
De meeste boterhammen liggen in de dozen  ARR: two   WRONG 
‘Most of the sandwiches are in the boxes’ 
De meeste fietsen liggen in de dozen    ARR: two   WRONG   
‘Most of the bicycles are in the boxes’  
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De meeste auto’s liggen in de dozen    ARR: two   WRONG  
‘Most of the cars are in the boxes’  
 
Sommige (‘Some’) 
Sommige klokken liggen in de dozen    ARR: five  WRONG 
‘Some of the clocks are in the boxes’  
Sommige bananen liggen in de dozen    ARR: five   WRONG 
‘Some of the bananas are in the boxes’   
Sommige auto’s liggen in de dozen     ARR: five   WRONG 
‘Some of the cars are in the boxes’  
Sommige telefoons liggen in de dozen     ARR: five   WRONG 
‘Some of the telephones are in the boxes’  
Sommige poppen liggen in de dozen    ARR: five   WRONG 
‘Some of the dolls are in the boxes’  
Sommige bloemen liggen in de dozen    ARR: five   WRONG 
‘Some of the flowers are in the boxes’  
Sommige sinaasappels liggen in de dozen   ARR: two   RIGHT 
‘Some of the oranges are in the boxes’  
Sommige pennen liggen in de dozen    ARR: two   RIGHT   
‘Some of the pens are in the boxes’  
Sommige peren liggen in de dozen     ARR: two   RIGHT  
‘Some of the pears are in the boxes’  
Sommige rokjes liggen in de dozen     ARR: none  WRONG  
‘Some of the skirts are in the boxes’  
Sommige appels liggen in de dozen    ARR: none  WRONG  
‘Some of the apples are in the boxes’  
Sommige aardbeien liggen in de dozen   ARR: none  WRONG 
‘Some of the strawberries are in the boxes’  
 
Geen (‘None’) 
Geen klok ligt in de dozen       ARR: none RIGHT 
‘None of the clocks are in the boxes’ 
Geen banaan ligt in de dozen      ARR: none RIGHT 
‘None of the bananas are in the boxes’ 
Geen bal ligt in de dozen       ARR: none RIGHT  
‘None of the balls are in the boxes’ 
Geen auto ligt in de dozen       ARR: two  WRONG 
‘None of the cars are in the boxes’ 
Geen ballon ligt in de dozen       ARR: two   WRONG 
‘None of the balloons are in the boxes’ 
Geen rokje ligt in de dozen       ARR: two   WRONG 
‘None of the skirts are in the boxes’ 
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